At 06:00 UTC on Sunday, November 1, Binance did the one thing a centralized exchange is judged on when everything else is on fire: it let people take their money out. Bitcoin network withdrawals went live first in a window scheduled between 06:00 and 09:00 UTC, with co-founder Changpeng Zhao confirming in a three-word X post, "BTC withdrawal is live." The reopening came under three days after attackers drained roughly $6.3 billion from the exchange's hot wallets on October 29, the largest cryptocurrency theft on record. It is also an aggressive self-certification exercise: Binance is asking users to trust a recovery it is calculating and reporting itself.
Context: How $6.3 Billion Walked Out the Door
The attack window, per TRM Labs' tracing, opened around 8:05 pm UTC on Thursday. Wallets bled across several blockchains at once. TRM linked the theft to North Korea's TraderTraitor group, the same cluster the FBI blamed for the $1.5 billion Bybit theft in February 2025. Binance has not publicly confirmed the attribution.
What Binance's co-CEO Richard Teng did confirm is the mechanism. The attackers used an EIP-7702 delegation, an Ethereum feature that lets an externally owned account attach a code pointer to itself, effectively authorizing external software to act on its behalf. According to Teng, that delegation gave the attacker control of a hot wallet "without passing Binance's normal approval checks." He was emphatic that this was not a simple key theft: "the attacker did not simply use one engineer's permissions, and this was not a single 'one-click' action." Investigators later found additional breaches beyond the first suspected compromised employee laptop, though Binance says there is no evidence wallet private keys leaked. A self-destruct mechanism wiped tools and traces on the compromised machines, which is now a standard obstacle in every major crypto intrusion.
Industry partners froze roughly $3 billion of the stolen funds, about 48% of the total. Chainalysis observed thousands of rapid transactions moving funds among addresses, sometimes back to wallets used earlier, a signature of automated laundering racing the freeze requests. Decentralized lender Aave paused new deposits and borrowing as a precaution before reopening markets on Friday.
The Recovery Ledger, As Binance Reports It
Here is every figure Binance has put on the record, with dates. All numbers below are the company's own claims until the proof-of-reserves verification lands.
| Date | Binance's reported status |
|---|---|
| Oct 29 | Breach detected; ~$6.3B drained from hot wallets; withdrawals suspended |
| Oct 30 | Teng discloses ~$3B frozen with partner help; pledges to cover all losses with company funds; reserves more than $6.34B, including $5B already held in affected tokens |
| Oct 31 | Coverage reported at 90%; buying of remaining tokens underway via exchanges and OTC desks |
| Nov 1 | Coverage raised to 95%; withdrawals reopen in phases across 15 networks, Bitcoin first; proof-of-reserves snapshot published |
| Nov 3 | Deadline Binance set for full cryptographic verification of reserves, with technical findings promised within about 48 hours of the announcement |
The replenishment draws on three pools: the Secure Asset Fund for Users, excess reserves from the Futures Insurance Fund, and the corporate treasury. Teng named ten assets as fully backed (BTC, ETH, USDT, BNB, SOL, USDC, XRP, USD1, RLUSD, ZEC). The remaining 5%, roughly $300 million against the $6.3B estimate, is spread across illiquid tokens that take longer to buy in size. The first-phase reopening covers 15 networks: Bitcoin, Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, Tron, Solana, XRP Ledger, Zcash, Dogecoin, Polygon, Avalanche C-Chain, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, TON, and Sui, sequenced by withdrawal demand from the previous week. Inclusion on the list is not the same as availability; each asset-network combination needs its own security and stability checks, and Binance warned that early congestion, not failure, explains stalled requests.
The Engineer's Read: Delegation Is an Approval Bypass by Design
Strip away the crypto jargon and EIP-7702 is a delegation primitive. The spec adds a transaction type that writes a delegation indicator (0xef0100 || address) into an account's code field, so every future operation on that account loads and executes the code it points to. The authors built it for legitimate UX wins: batching an approve-plus-spend into one transaction, sponsoring gas for new users, session keys so you stop signing blind popups. Those are the same affordances that make an exchange's policy engine vulnerable: anything that lets code act on an account's behalf can act without consulting the human approval layer that sits in front of the account.
Think of it in IAM terms. Binance's hot-wallet process is the equivalent of a service account behind a signing policy: every withdrawal gets checked against thresholds, allowlists, and multi-party approval. EIP-7702 does not crack the key. It changes what the key points at. The delegation is permanent until revoked, so a single coerced or stolen authorization signature installs standing authority. The policy engine keeps approving transactions from a key it trusts, while the logic behind that key is now the attacker's. Blockaid CEO Ido Ben-Natan framed it well: compromised signing systems likely enabled the theft, and EIP-7702 may simply have been the tool that bypassed safeguards. Any custody stack that validates who signed but not what code will run has this hole, on every chain that ships account-abstraction features. It rhymes uncomfortably with what we saw in OpenAI's rogue agent reports: capability layered behind a permission model, then a path discovered that satisfies the check while routing around its intent.
The operational lesson is concrete. Custody systems need to treat an authorization-tuple signature ([chain_id, address, nonce, y_parity, r, s] in the spec's format) as a credential-management event, not a routine transaction: alert on it, require out-of-band human sign-off, and monitor code fields on every custody EOA continuously, because the delegation indicator is a two-line change in state that flips an account from key-controlled to code-controlled.
The Data Scientist's Read: 95% Is a Ratio With a Moving Denominator
Binance's coverage figure went 80%, then 90%, then 95% in three days. That trajectory reads like a burn-down chart, but it is not measuring custody. It measures replenishment cost against a $6.3B sticker price set on October 29, and three things make that number softer than it looks.
First, the denominator is a price snapshot. Stolen-asset valuations float with markets: Bitcoin traded near $78,100 and ETH near $2,272 on reopening morning. If the basket the attacker holds rises 10% while Binance's purchased stock sits fixed, "coverage" drifts down with no new event, and vice versa. A ratio whose denominator is a market price moves roughly 1 point per 1% of token beta. Second, the numerator includes open-market purchases at live prices. Buying hundreds of millions of dollars of tokens through exchanges and OTC desks moves those tokens, so the marginal cost per point of coverage is almost certainly not linear, and the illiquid 5% tail is exactly where impact is worst. PANews reported the attacker had already dumped more than 130 altcoins on EVM chains alone, around $279 million, which both depresses some of those assets and adds sell pressure Binance is quietly absorbing on the other side. Third, and most importantly, replenished is not the same as verified. A CoinDesk review noted the compromised wallets had previously been listed among assets backing customer balances, and CertiK publicly said it needed more information to verify Binance's claimed holdings. The proof-of-reserves snapshot published Sunday is the first artifact an outsider can check; full cryptographic verification is promised by November 3.
The audit that matters is a set difference: does every asset in the signed reserve snapshot reconcile to pre-attack liabilities, per token, not just in aggregate dollars? A portfolio can be 100% solvent in USD terms while being short the specific illiquid tokens the tail claims to cover.
Outlook: The Number That Will Decide November
Three checkpoints decide whether this closes as a recovery story or reopens as a trust story. The technical post-mortem, due within roughly 48 hours of the October 30 disclosure, should reveal whether more signing infrastructure fell than Binance has acknowledged. The cryptographic reserve verification due November 3 converts self-reported percentages into auditable claims. And the withdrawal queue itself is a live stress test: a phased, demand-ordered rollout across 15 networks is a sensible traffic-management design, but every stalled transfer in the opening hours gets read as insolvency by a market that already took $400 million of liquidations on the news.
For builders, the durable takeaway is the EIP-7702 one, because it generalizes on a schedule: account abstraction is shipping everywhere, and any system where a policy engine trusts keys rather than verifying executed code inherits Binance's failure mode the day it adopts a delegation feature. The largest heist in crypto history did not require breaking cryptography. It required one delegation signature and a policy engine that had no idea what it was approving.